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Abstract 
 
Alcohol policies encounter major problems because of the lack of consensus within 
and between jurisdictions. Tools which economists have developed in other contexts 
may be of use in addressing these problems.  
The consensus between neighboring jurisdictions can be facilitated, when a 
jurisdiction with higher alcohol taxes and bigger alcohol revenue offers to share part 
of it with the neighbor with lower alcohol revenue and lower alcohol taxes. The final 
solution can consist in both jurisdictions having larger revenues and in reduced 
alcohol consumption.  
Decreasing support for alcohol curbing policies within some jurisdictions could 
probably be reversed, if such tools as   revenue neutrality of alcohol taxes, heavier 
taxation of heavy drinkers, introduction of minimum prices, substitution of low 
quality drinks by high quality food and drinks were to be employed and if greater 
attention were to be given to the determinants of alcohol needs and in particular of 
‘happiness’. 
 
Key words:  Alcohol needs progressive taxation, revenue sharing/transfers, 
minimum price, budget neutrality, substitution. 
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Introduction 
“Among the various strategies that states and nations  use to control alcohol-related 
problems, the regulation of alcohol taxes and prices has been by far the most 
popular” (Babor et al, 2003:101). The economics literature provides potentially 
useful insights and methods to those trying to design effective alcohol policies 
capable of commanding wide consensus. It has tools which can be used in the 
situation where the consensus must be built between neighboring jurisdictions. It can 
suggest ways of representing and analyzing the impact not just of  price but of other 
variables on the consumption of alcohol.  
Other disciplines have contributed recent research on population level studies 
of alcohol problems and policy interventions.  The research identifies the problem 
that disagreement between jurisdictions on the right alcohol policy to be 
implemented leads to differences in alcohol regulations between neighboring  
jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions reduce their alcohol taxes in order to cope with  
competition from neighbors with lower alcohol taxes, or to cope with illegal imports. 
Economic analysis can show that the two jurisdictions might achieve  a joint 
maximum revenue, if they could agree on a common high tax rate, but that this 
solution might be financially non optimal for the neighbor, if it had the smaller 
population or a lower income. It would probably prefer the sub-optimal solution of 
competing with lower taxes while poaching consumers or firms (as tax base) from 
the considered jurisdiction.  In this case, an option which is open to the bigger and 
richer jurisdiction is to offer to its neighbor some financial compensation to convince 
it not to adopt the sub-optimal solution. 
Again, recent research has shown that within particular jurisdictions, there is 
little support for policies aimed at reducing alcohol consumption by raising its price 
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through  higher alcohol taxes. This because alcohol taxes put an additional burden on 
most of tax payers, can reduce the profits of alcohol producers, do not deal with the 
needs, which are behind alcohol demand and are considered by many consumers as a 
limitation of their freedom.   In this case the contribution of economics is in the 
systematic analysis of alcohol demand.  Economists would start by drawing a graph  
(figure 1) where the vertical axis indicates price and  the horizontal axis the  quantity 
that consumers are actually ready to buy. The downward slope of the line depicts the 
familiar fact that demand is lower when prices are higher and is greater when prices 
are lower.  
Figure 1 here 
The diagram will illustrate how a higher tax, and the consequent increase in 
price, reduces demand; it will also be used to indicate how  factors other than price 
affect the demand for the product. These factors can, at parity of price, bring about a 
greater or smaller consumption of the good. This is represented by a shift of the 
demand curve to the right or to the left. 1  
Economists also draw graphs with two goods or basket of goods on the axis 
(A and B  in figure 2). A straight line from the top left side of the graph towards the 
bottom right side indicates the budget constraint: consumer should consume less of 
good A in order to consume more of good B, because their available budget is 
limited. They can only choose mixes within this line; while those above it are not 
affordable for them. Their preferences are represented by curved lines indicating all 
the possible mix of goods which leave a consumer with the same level of 
satisfaction: the indifference curves. The higher the curve the more satisfied is the 
consumer. An optimal point can be found where the highest possible curve (high 
                                                 
1
 For a detailed  presentation of these issues see Varian (2006).  
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level of satisfaction) touches the budget constraint. Changes in tastes of consumers 
result in changes of the indifference curves. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Certain alcohol policies could attract greater popular support if they were 
aimed not only at increasing alcohol prices, but also at reducing alcohol needs: 
socialization, fresh options for the use of free time, availability of affordable and 
healthy entertainment, stress reduction, pain alleviation and creation of a more 
relaxed environment: in sum, improvement of happiness.  The selection and use of 
indicators of ‘happiness’ has recently emerged as a fruitful direction in the 
economics literature. 
The following section considers the issue of consensus between jurisdictions. 
The third section deals with consensus within jurisdictions, when the policy variable 
is alcohol price. Then this paper considers ways of changing alcohol demand, 
without acting directly on the price of alcohol.  
 
 
 
 5 
 
Consensus between jurisdictions: competing jurisdictions and cross border 
purchases 
“The efficacy of fiscal control [on alcohol] may in some circumstances be eroded 
where borders are long or open” (Edwards et al. 1995:120). Babor et al. (2003), 
Stafstroem (2006), Andréasson et al. (2006), and Asbridge and Weersinghe (2006) 
provide examples of how the existence of neighboring jurisdictions, between which 
there is cross border trade and smuggling, can seriously complicate the 
implementation of alcohol policies (some of  their examples are drawn from the 
borders between Finland and Estonia, Sweden and Denmark/Germany and Chicago - 
USA and Canada). The relative absence of neighbors (Bjoernsson, 2006, considering 
Iceland and Midford et al., 2006, considering an isolated Australian community) 
increases the freedom of policy makers. Cross border purchases are prevalent all 
over Europe (Anderson and Baumberg, 2006)   where it is common for national 
policy makers to allege that the EU exposes their countries to cross border purchases 
of alcohol or limits their ability to control them (Stafstroem, 2006, Holder et al., 
2006 and Hope, 2006).2 
                                                 
2
 The EU has so far paid very little attention to public health and safety implications of its alcohol 
policies (Babor et al, 2003); its action, for explicit request from some member states, e.g. UK, has 
been mostly confined to the creation of an internal market, without dealing with such issues as health, 
where EU powers are still extremely limited.  This has increased the lobbying power of business and 
limited the scope of the action of health-concerned organizations. However member states often 
justify even those choices which are completely within their own powers, by suggesting EU 
interference. Again, the Swedish and Finnish governments did not make an issue of their existing 
alcohol policies, when negotiating the access of their countries into the EU; probably for this reason 
they made little or no impact in the alcohol field, while they achieved considerably more in other 
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In a 1990 study of USA, Baltagi and Goel (1990) suggested that the impact of cross-
border purchases was not so significant, with no marked influence on the price-
elasticity of alcohol demand.  Subsequent studies find “possible ‘border purchasing 
effects,’ which Baltagi and Griffin (1995) found important in explaining why some 
very low tax states enjoy much higher per capita liquor sales than neighboring states 
with higher taxes” (Baltagi and Griffin. 2002: 487). “Border crossing alters the 
apparent elasticities of demand in ways that can significantly affect the ability of 
[USA] state-level jurisdictions to pursue independent tax treatments of alcoholic 
beverages” (Beard et al., 1997:294). The case of the UK-France border is probably 
different, as this is a sea-crossing; and Crawford et al. (1999) do not detect any 
important effects of cross border purchases on UK alcohol demand elasticities. 
Because the choice of alcohol policy is normally heavily influenced by the 
presence of neighboring jurisdictions, this leads us to consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of alcohol policy harmonization and revenue sharing.  Alcohol taxes 
harmonization is related with the general issue of tax harmonization between 
different jurisdictions, because alcohol taxes are only one component of the general 
tax policy. In favor of harmonization there is the economic consideration that “to the 
extent that consumers’ purchase decisions are driven by tax differences rather than 
by underlying differences in producer prices, cross-border shopping causes an 
inefficient allocation of resources.” (Crawford and Tanner, 1995:96).   For a 
presentation about the welfare advantages in indirect taxes harmonization see Lopez-
Garcia (1998). Tiebout (1956) suggests that tax competition allows consumers to 
                                                                                                                                          
fields, e.g.  the environment.  In the case of the UK, the influence of purchases abroad is negligible; 
however, UK alcohol taxes have continuously decreased as a share of GDP thanks to decisions of the 
HM Treasury.  
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chose the optimal level of taxation, but tax competition can demolish the ability of 
countries to redistribute income  (Sinn, 1990). Wilson (1999) offers a discussion on 
advantages and disadvantages of tax competition, and implicitly of tax 
harmonization.  
 Tax harmonization can be a disadvantage for the smaller neighbor, because 
it loses taxes from shoppers of the larger jurisdiction (Kanbur and Keen, 1993; 
Wang, 1999). However Verdonck (2004) shows that with transfers of a specific form 
(revenue sharing) a cooperation which leads to maximize the joint revenue of the 
two countries is indeed individually rational for both countries and, in that sense, 
sustainable.  
Taking the initiative to share alcohol revenue is a tool more easily available to 
jurisdictions whose alcohol revenue is larger than that of their neighbors for 
whatever reason: e.g.  because they have more population or because they have a 
higher per capita income or simply because they have higher taxes on alcohol. This 
tool could be used to induce the jurisdiction which is smaller, poorer or which has 
lower alcohol taxes, not to oppose alcohol tax harmonization. 3  Revenue sharing of 
this kind is already practiced in federal countries (Shah, 1996), mostly between 
central government and federate states, but has not been explicitly used between 
different countries (although certain uses of rich nations’ aid budgets could be given 
this interpretation).  In principle it should be possible for a jurisdiction, which has a 
large population, is rich or has high alcohol taxes to share its alcohol revenue with a 
smaller or poorer or lower-tax neighbor. This would be done with the objective of 
                                                 
3
 Even in the case of two perfectly identical countries, revenue sharing, could theoretically work, if 
for one jurisdiction alcohol policy is much more a priority than for the other one. But this is probably 
a rather extreme case. 
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motivating the neighbor to introduce higher alcohol taxes in its jurisdiction or at least 
in the relevant border region. In this way the jurisdiction   with bigger revenue from 
alcohol taxes would be able to eliminate the competition of the low prices of the 
neighbor and to keep its previous alcohol policy. The low taxing neighbor would 
lose its autonomous alcohol policy, but would increase its alcohol revenue and hence 
be able to reduce other taxes or to increase public investment and services to 
citizens. While government financial departments might oppose such sharing of 
alcohol revenue with a neighboring jurisdiction because in principle they avoid 
‘earmarking’ their tax revenues, in this case the prospect of increasing the total tax 
take could be a powerful incentive for innovation.4 
Again, in cases where two jurisdictions with similar alcohol revenues have very 
different tax levels and structures re alcoholic beverages, parallel financial 
agreements in other field (e.g. agriculture, environment) where they are also seeking 
agreement could enter the negotiation, with concessions in one field compensating 
for agreement over alcohol policy. If alcohol policy is the only field of disagreement, 
then a bargain becomes more difficult. 
 At the time of writing, no initiative of this kind, with bilateral revenue-sharing 
between countries, has yet been attempted in the alcohol field.  
                                                 
4
 Additionally, earmarking the revenue source (declaring that the money going to the neighbour 
comes from the alcohol revenue) is not essential. The neighbour with lower revenue from alcohol 
taxes must just receive a compensation   for adopting an alcohol policy, which initially does not 
desire. It does not really matter where the money of this compensation comes from. 
 9 
 
Consensus within jurisdictions: reducing alcohol demand increasing alcohol 
price. 
Public support for alcohol-related policies, especially those aimed at 
increasing price or reducing availability, has been notoriously difficult to achieve 
and has in some cases been  shrinking (Giesbrecht and Greenfield, 1999, Giesbrecht, 
2000, Greenfield et al., 2006); this is despite authoritative new evidence about the 
negative effects of excessive episodic alcohol consumption (Edwards et al. 1995; 
Babor et al., 2003; Bjoernsson, 2006; Holder et al., 2006; Hope, 2006; Midford et al., 
2006; Nash Parker, 2006). In particular it appears to be very difficult to campaign 
successfully for higher taxes on alcohol, even when these are justified in terms of 
generating revenue to finance health services (Greenfield et al., 2006).  
Revenue neutrality 
A hypothesis not considered in the papers cited above is the introduction of 
alcohol taxes with the condition of revenue neutrality, i.e. promising that the new 
revenue will be directed at reducing the general tax burden on consumers and 
business. Revenue neutrality it is not a novel concept: debates making use of the idea 
have  taken place in the context of environmental issues (e.g. Koskela and Schöb, 
1999) and of the choice between different types of alcohol taxation (Flanagan, 
2003)5 . While the spokespeople focusing on alcohol harm-reduction are relatively 
                                                 
5
 Flanagan (2003) describes a change in Alberta from “ad valorem” alcohol taxes to” per unit” alcohol 
taxes and shows that “per unit” alcohol taxes were not able to follow the growth of income and prices; 
this eventually led to a revenue reduction. The issue of maintaining during the years the revenue 
depends on the structuring and on the updating of the taxes. The changes that he described took place 
together with changes in the distribution system of alcohol (from a state controlled monopoly to a 
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few, there are many taxpayers and voters interested in the possibility of tax 
reductions and there may be ways of recruiting their support. Some practical 
experience exists already in the field of revenue neutrality applied to alcohol taxes: 
on June 1st 2006 the Canadian government implemented a GST (Canadian equivalent 
of the VAT) reduction, which was partially compensated with an increase of alcohol 
excises. 
Higher taxes for heavy drinkers 
Murray (2006) stresses that the biggest alcohol related threat for health 
comes from heavy episodic drinking, while routine drinking at meals does not seem 
to lead to significant health damages.   If this result were to win general acceptance, 
it would lead to reconsideration of how best to tax alcohol, identifying a modality to 
tax excessive consumption with a high rate, while not taxing usual moderate 
consumption.  This idea of distinguishing between different types of drinkers has 
some elements in common with that of selective prohibition (Watt and Naidu, 2002). 
That idea has its root in evidence of the strong relation between alcohol consumption 
and crime (e.g. Gyimah-Brempong, 2001; Markowitz, 2000; Chaloupka et al., 2002) 
and has led to the suggestion of targeting certain crime offenders with alcohol 
prohibition and introducing an alcohol identity card.  
While the suggestion of Watt and Naidu is only concerned with crime, the 
analysis can readily be extended to take account of health and other social issues  
e.g. chronic damage from alcohol (Chaloupka et al., 2002; Farrell et al., 2003; 
Midanik, 2004;), graduation failure (Yamada et al., 1993), violence and drinking and 
                                                                                                                                          
private oligopoly). This makes more difficult disentangling the effects of the two types of changes. As 
it can be seen, Flanagan’s example of neutrality is completely different from the case suggested in this 
paper, which concerns substituting general taxes with increased alcohol taxes.  
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driving (Chaloupka et al., 1993; Grossman et al., 1994; Saffer and Grossman, 1987; 
Chaloupka et al., 2002). “The evidence available [...] strongly indicates that heavy 
and dependent drinkers are at least as responsive to price as are moderate 
consumers” (Edwards et al., 1995:119). Grossman (2004) shows similar findings. A 
policy which devised different ways of taxing  moderate and heavy consumption 
might gain the support of a majority of moderate consumers, who also constitute the 
majority of voters. 
Gaining the support of alcohol producers: fixing minimum prices. 
 The paucity of support for policies aimed at the negative effects of alcohol 
abuse may also be related to the influence exercised by the economic interests 
involved (Giesbrecht, 2000): alcohol producers, distributors and the hospitality, 
recreation and catering industry. There is further Canadian experience, which is 
important not only in terms of consensus building with this constituency, but also in 
terms of avoiding quality substitution: the definition of minimum prices. Higher 
taxes can lead to quality substitution (e.g. Gruenwald et al., 2006; Andrienko and 
Nemtsov, 2005; Crawford and Tanner. 1995; Crawford et al., 1999;   Nelson and 
Young, 2001), with heavy drinkers switching to drinks of poorer quality and 
extremely limited effects on public health. To avoid this, Canadian authorities 
introduced minimum prices (Babor et al. 2003; Sawka et al., 2006). If minimum 
prices can be enforced, an alcoholic drink, e.g. a beer, will be never sold below a 
certain price.6 In this way two objectives can be achieved: drinks are sold at higher 
                                                 
6
 From a public health and safety perspective, a minimum price can be based on the pure ethanol in 
the weakest beverage, e.g 3.5% beer at 341 ml in Canada, and then subsequent prices can be higher so 
that if I buy a 7.0% strength beer it would be twice as much per bottle, since I am getting double the 
ethanol. 
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prices without quality substitution and without the opposition of producers and 
traders, which do not see their profits reduce. 7  
 Of course this policy assumes a jurisdiction which is able to avoid the 
production and sale of illegal alcohol. From a public health and safety perspective, 
the 'effective ingredient' to achieve a reduced level of consumption is the real price, 
not the tax. Tax is a lever to raise the real price. This can be achieved by 
combination of taxes and price mark-ups, or primarily by one or the other. Producers 
generally don't like increased taxes because there is no increased income for them.  
However, if governments and producers can agree to increase overall prices, and 
'split' the increase between taxes and mark-ups, then this might be one way forward.  
 
Consensus within jurisdictions: reducing alcohol demand without increasing 
alcohol price. 
 
Figure 3 here 
Reducing alcohol needs 
It is probably the case that many alcohol policies are unpopular because they 
merely aim at causing a movement along the alcohol demand curve (Figure 3) 
towards higher alcohol prices and smaller demanded quantities; i.e. they make 
something that consumers wish to buy more expensive. The needs of consumers do 
not change, but the satisfaction of those needs becomes more costly.  A more 
promising strategy would be to shift the alcohol demand curve to the left, (Figure 4) 
i.e. reducing or satisfying in alternative ways the needs (socialization, entertainment, 
                                                 
7
 According to the successful anti tobacco campaigner Michael Perley, good health advocates are 
ready to have widely differing different bedfellows. 
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stress reduction, etc.) that drinkers believe that alcohol can satisfy. Many studies 
(e.g.  Saha and Grant, 2006; Norström, 2006; Blake and Nied, 1997, Blaylock and 
Blisard, 1993, Blundell et al, 1993, Freeman, 2000) consider the various 
determinants of alcohol consumption, and therefore, implicitly, the issue of the 
position of the demand curve.  The topic certainly merits much   investigation. 
 
  Figure 4 here 
 
Midford et al. (2006) cite the example of communities of miners in Western 
Australia, where the availability of income and the absence of amenities or healthy 
ways to spend free time are probably connected with high levels of alcohol abuse (a 
very high alcohol demand).  Such research into the determinants of alcohol 
consumption and the possibility of finding alternatives focuses attention on the real 
needs that drinkers try to satisfy with their consumption, without stigmatizing them 
too much. 
Current research into measures and indexes of ‘happiness’ (e.g. Layard, 
2003; Di Tella and Mac Culloch, 2006) paves the way for investigating whether 
there is a negative relation between happiness and alcohol need.  If a negative 
relation between these two variables can be demonstrated, it would be worthwhile to 
look for ways of enhancing happiness as a route to reducing drunkenness. This 
approach offers  the perspective of enlarging the constituency of those who can 
support those measures8, which are aimed at reducing not only the consumed 
                                                 
8
 Information and persuasion campaigns should also focus more attention on telling politicians and the 
general public that certain policies can be very effective in reducing harm. 
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quantities through higher prices, but also at reducing the quantity that each consumer 
is ready to pay for every price, i.e. its willingness to drink.  
This approach also implies challenges because it transforms alcohol policy 
into a wider policy. It touches working conditions, when they affect the level of 
stress and eating patterns of workers. It touches sport policy, youth policy and urban 
planning, when we think of the availability of sport facilities, of affordable musical 
events and to an environment, which permits a healthy use of free time and does not 
hinder socialization in absence of alcohol. It also touches the issues of the 
empowerment of local communities and their perception of being able to determine 
their own future, with the associated issues of self-esteem and disenfranchisement. 
The substitution of bulk alcohol with quality food 
 The need for binge drinking can probably decrease if schools become involved in 
enhancing a practice and a culture which appreciates good-quality food in its 
nutritional, social and cultural aspects, as can already be seen in countries with low 
levels of binge drinking (e.g. Italy)  which pay attention to healthy, high quality and 
high value   food9. Schools should not spend too much time in giving classes about 
healthy food, but should increase the quality and availability of the meals that they 
offer. For example in the UK the average schools can spend for the meal of each 
pupil  less than half a pound  i.e. less than one US dollar (House of Commons, 
2007), which is about half the price of a London bus ticket  for a trip of few hundred 
meters. Nobody can reasonably expect that children can acquire a taste for quality 
food and quality drinks if their school shows so little care for their nutrition. A 
                                                 
9
 In this context it is worth remembering that Kerr and Yu Ye (2006) refer to the possible damages 
deriving from soft drinks, which often accompany junk food, putting in evidence that not only alcohol 
can be a serious threat to human health but also many alcohol free beverages. 
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parallel action could consist in acting on relative prices, subsidizing quality food in 
order to familiarize families with it. 
It is of interest (Figure 5) that in a set of rich countries (Austria, Australia, 
Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Hong Kong,  Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Nederland, Singapore, Spain,  Sweden, UK,  USA)  the budget share of 
alcohol consumption can be expressed as a negative function of the ratio between the 
budget share 
 
Figure 5  here 
 
of food consumption and that of alcohol consumption. Basically countries which 
spend a considerable share of their GDP on alcohol are also those countries where 
the food expenditure is only slightly larger than the alcohol expenditure, while 
countries, which do not spend much on alcohol, have food expenditures which are 
substantially greater than their alcohol expenditure.  This is not yet hard evidence of 
substitution between food and drinks, but it does suggest this as a topic for further 
investigation.  
Again, might it be possible to modify consumers’ preferences from heavy 
episodic drinking towards high quality food? (Figure 6). The dark downward line 
represents the budget constraint of the consumer. Its slope denotes the ratio between 
the prices of the two types of consumption. In both case A and case B prices are the 
same, but consumer preferences are different. This leads to an increased 
consumption of quality food and to a reduced consumption of alcohol. The budget 
constraint of the consumer does not change, relative prices need not to change, but in 
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this context consumers wish to modify their choices consuming less alcohol and 
more quality food.   
 
Figure 6 here 
A minimalist strategy: The substitution of bulk alcohol  with quality drinks 
A specific example takes the topic of wine consumption: how to move from a 
large consumption of low quality/low price drinks to a more limited consumption of 
high quality/high price drinks. Figure 7 illustrates this. A change of preferences leads 
to the substitution of large quantities of cheap wines (A) by smaller quantities of 
quality wines (B);  in countries where this occurs, there is an overall reduction in   
consumption. Expensive/high quality wine is not less dangerous than cheap table 
wine, but since it is less affordable, buying large quantities of it is more difficult for 
consumers. Italy (Carbone, 2002) and Chile (Troncoso Valverde, 2004) have already 
followed this path. It is another limited but interesting path towards reduced alcohol 
consumption and it would suggest that educating consumers to the different value of 
different drinks could play a role in reducing total alcohol consumption.  There is 
little evidence that education and persuasion strategies in the prevention of alcohol 
harm are effective (Babor et al., 2003), but this effort would not be aimed at inducing 
consumers to drink less or more responsibly. It would be aimed solely at inducing 
consumers to switch to more expensive alcohol products, and commercial marketing 
might well see advantages in collaborating in this campaign. 
 
Figure 7 here 
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Conclusion   
The campaign for increasing the support for alcohol-related policies both 
between and within jurisdictions is not yet completely lost. Economics suggests that 
there are several powerful tools whose potential has not yet been fully exploited. 
Consensus between jurisdictions 
The disagreement between jurisdictions does not always mean that an alcohol 
concerned  jurisdiction is compelled to follow its low taxing neighbor and  reduce its 
alcohol taxes. In some cases neighbors can try to reach a revenue sharing agreement, 
seeking to maximize alcohol revenue. The jurisdiction which wants higher tax rates, 
shares part of its alcohol revenue with its neighbor and the latter compensates the 
former by increasing its alcohol taxes. 
Consensus within jurisdictions: operating with a certain alcohol demand. 
Given a certain alcohol demand, the key variable to reduce the demanded 
quantity is price;  tax is merely one component of price. Alcohol taxes are not 
popular because hit many consumers and can eventually reduce the profits of 
producers.  In order to reduce their impact on the majority of the population and on 
producers it is possible to use: 
• Revenue neutrality ; 
• Progressive taxation; 
• Lower limits on  prices. 
The first measure consists in increasing alcohol taxes to reduce other taxes, the 
second in taxing heavy drinkers in a disproportionate way and the third in fixing a 
price below which no unit of alcohol can be sold. 
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Consensus within jurisdictions: modifying the alcohol demand, without acting on the 
price of alcohol 
An alternative approach aims at reducing alcohol demand by measures other 
than price. This can be achieved by: 
• Substituting cheap drinks with good-quality drinks; 
• Substituting  cheap drinks with good-quality food; 
• Reducing alcohol need by increasing overall ‘happiness’ 
The first measure pushes consumers towards more expensive drinks, which they will 
tend to consume in more limited quantities, the second is a stronger change towards 
a practice which values food more than alcohol and the third is a radical change 
towards a policy which goes at the root of the problem and tries to deal with those 
variables which push some people toward heavy drinking. 
In an interdependent world, any jurisdiction will be best able to carry out effective 
alcohol policies if it gains consensus among its citizens and if it wins the consensus 
of neighboring jurisdictions. This paper suggests ways of facilitating such consensus. 
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Figure 1    The demand curve. 
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Figure 2  The budget constraint (straight line) indicates the alternative baskets of 
goods, which the consumer can afford; the curve of indifference (curved line) 
represents those baskets of goods which give the consumer the same degree of 
satisfaction. In this graph the point where the two lines touch each other represents 
for the consumer the minimum cost to reach a certain level of satisfaction. 
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Figure 3    Increasing price to reduce demanded quantity 
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Figure 4   Moving alcohol demand to the left, reducing alcohol need. 
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Figure 5   Budget share of alcohol and the ratio between the budget share of food and 
the budget share of alcohol. 
Year 1992. 
Elaboration of the author on data from Selvanathan and Selvanathan, 2005:183. 
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Figure 6   The substitution of alcohol with quality food. 
 
The straight line represents the budget constraint of the consumer. The curved lines 
indicate all the possible mix of goods which leave a consumer indifferent. An 
optimal point can be found where the highest possible curve (high level of 
satisfaction) touches the budget constraint. In this graph the consumer has changed 
preferences from curve A to curve B. 
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          H i g h    q u a l i t y   w i n e 
 
 
Figure 7   From large quantities of low quality drinks to small quantities of high 
quality drinks. High quality drinks are more expensive and, assuming a constant 
budget and the same alcohol content in the two types of wine, this leads the 
consumer to drink less alcohol. 
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